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ARTICLE I.

ON THE COMPARATIVE MERITS OF PHRENOLOGY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF REID AND STEWART.

In the year 1836, a correspondence took place between Professor Alison, P. Neill, L. L. D., and Mr. Geo. Combe, (all of Edinburgh) in reference to the merits of Phrenology, as compared with the philosophy of Reid and Stewart. This correspondence was called out in consequence of there being two rival candidates for the chair of Logic in the University of Edinburgh, whose claims for election were based on entirely different systems of Mental Philosophy. Sir William Hamilton, who proved the successful candidate, is a thorough-going advocate of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart; while Mr. Combe's views of mental science are well known to be based entirely on the principles of phrenology. As the correspondence alluded to, enters pretty clearly and thoroughly into the comparative merits of the two systems of philosophy, we propose to transfer from Mr. Combe's testimonials the more important portions of this correspondence to our pages. Dr. Alison, who took a part in the discussion, is a Professor of Physiology in Edinburgh, and is well known as an able writer on Medicine. Dr. Neill, who was also engaged in it, is a member of several learned societies and is distinguished for his literary and scientific attainments. He appears as the advocate of phrenology in the following letter to Professor Alison:

According to promise, I shall now, as briefly as possible, yet I trust intelligibly, state my reasons for differing from you in regard to Reid and Stewart's philosophy, and for thinking that the credit of our University is so far from being bound up with that system, that it would, on the contrary, be signally promoted by adopting a mental philosophy founded on the discoveries of Gall. It may appear bold in a person situate as I am to venture to differ on such a subject from you; but after having been rather an attentive pupil of Finlayson and Stewart in 1799 and 1800,

and after reading the best treatises in our language, I was led many years ago, by intimacy with Mr. Forster, Dr. Leach, and Dr. Spurzheim, to examine Gall's system with considerable care; and I have also availed myself of the admirable writings and lectures of Mr. Combe. Now, if it so happen that you have not bestowed attention on the new doctrines, and have not examined the evidence on which they are founded, (which I suspect is the case) then, inferior as I feel myself in all other respects, I have here the advantage of you.

In my humble opinion, then, Reid and Stewart's philosophy is altogether unsound in its basis. It rests on observations made by each individual on his own consciousness. Now, consciousness gives us no intimation of any thing in mental philosophy, except the *state* of our *own* minds at the moment when we attend to our inward condition. Some of the consequences of this important fact may here be traced.

1. We cannot thus discover the existence and functions of the mental organs, because consciousness does not indicate their presence in mental operations.

2. We cannot thus distinguish primitive faculties from mere modes of action of the faculties; i. e. if we only had consciousness to guide us in regard to the philosophy of the external senses, we should be led to describe taste, smell, sight, hearing, and touch, all as modes of action, or modes of impression, of the mind generally, and should never discover that they are separate and distinct senses. In like manner, in regard to the internal faculties, the school of Reid mistakes Memory, Imagination, Conception, and Perception, for primitive powers; while the most indisputable facts prove that these are only modes of action of the real faculties, ascertained by the school of Gall, and called in phrenological language Locality, Coloring, Individuality, &c.; each having a distinct organ, and there being, of course, many kinds of memory.

3. In consequence of this radical defect in the basis of Reid and Stewart's philosophy, it can never, I apprehend, become useful, or afford the foundation for any sound logic. For example, if a metaphysician of the Reid school were rather deficient in organs of Conscientiousness, he might be apt to deny the existence of a moral sense; and so of others. Further, in consequence of reflecting merely on his own consciousness, he must remain totally ignorant of many of the active impulses, such as (if you will excuse me for again using phrenological language, which I find the most precise) Combativeness, Destructiveness, Acquisitiveness, Secretiveness, which strongly prevail in the world of real life, but which may possibly never indicate themselves to the philosopher in the calm retirement of the closet. Hence such metaphysicians can never, by

their mode of investigation, arrive at a correct knowledge of all the faculties; for each philosopher will naturally be inclined to deny the existence of faculties in the organs of which he may himself happen to be rather deficient.

4. Reid's philosophy never can give an explanation of the differences between the mental capacity of one man and that of another, because it is confined in its basis to the mind of *the individual* who studies it.

5. It cannot possibly explain the phenomena of insanity, because it totally overlooks the organs, by the diseases of which insanity is occasioned, as now admitted by many eminent physicians and physiologists of the greatest experience in asylums.

6. It cannot be applied to the elucidation of the causes of the tendency, of some individuals to one pursuit, and of others to other pursuits; of some to mathematics and others to painting; of some to hoarding and others to profuseness, &c.; because these differences depend on differences in the relative size and on the activity of certain organs, of which that philosophy takes no cognizance.

7. A sound philosophy ought to expound the whole faculties of man, both affective and intellectual, the relations subsisting between them and the external world, physical and mental, and the method by which they may be best applied in the attainment of good, morally—and of truth, intellectually. The philosophy of Reid can never accomplish these ends; because it never reaches the primitive faculties at all, but deals in generalities about their modes of action.

In consequence of the imperfect analysis of the mind thus presented by this philosophy, we would never have been led to think of *educating* the faculties, feelings, and affections, as is now, by the lights of phrenology, successfully done from the earliest ages in infant schools, up to grammar schools where the teachers have had the good fortune to become acquainted with phrenology.

I entirely dissent from your conclusion, therefore, that phrenology will merely enlarge the sphere of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart. According to my views, phrenology will rather sweep that away; and if we get something more useful, why should we deplore its being so swept away? When I consider the light which phrenological books are throwing on the causes and cure of insanity, (so interesting in any discussion about mind) on education, on criminal legislation, I clearly perceive the superiority of the new philosophy, and wish it all success. It is perhaps rather a low consideration, but is an important one, that the writings of Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart are no longer in demand in

this country, while new editions, of thousands, of Mr. Combe's works are in constant request.*

Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart admitted in general terms, as Professor Alison does, that a connexion subsists between the mind and the brain; but in their whole doctrines the following considerations are overlooked:—

1. The influence of the condition of the brain, as to age, size, health, and temperament, on the mental manifestations.

2. The connexion of particular parts of the brain with particular mental faculties.

3. The influence of the size and condition of each particular part on the mental faculty which it serves to manifest.

A description of the phenomena of mind, omitting these considerations, bears the same relation to mental science which a detail of the phenomena of vision, omitting all notice of the structure of the eye and its laws of action, would bear to optics. Science is perfect only in proportion as it embraces and elucidates the causes and relations of the phenomena of which it treats. Tried by this test, the philosophy of Reid and Stewart is extremely defective; for it omits all practical consideration of the material organs of the mind, on the condition of which depend its power of acting in this life, the degree of its vigor, the soundness of its perceptions, and the strength of its different functions.

Not only is it chargeable with these actual deficiences, but its methods do not admit of their being supplied. Mr. Stewart, as I have said, repeatedly refers to our own consciousness as the grand source of information in mental philosophy, to which Professor Alison adds "inferences as to the mental acts of others;" but neither reflection on consciousness, nor inferences regarding the mental acts of others, will enable us to discover the influence of the brain on the mental faculties. We are not conscious of the influence of the organs on the faculties, and, in observing the action of other men, we do not perceive indications of the influence of their brains. We must go a step farther. We must compare the condition as to size, health, age, and temperament of their brains, and of each particular part of them, with their powers of manifesting the mind and its particular faculties; and, whatever "fallacies" this method may be liable to, no progress can possibly be made in discovering the influence of the organization until this shall be done.

Professor Alison is disposed to admit the connection of the fore part

* We here leave the correspondence between Dr. Neill and Professor Alison, to introduce Mr. Combe's letter which discusses more definitely and fully the points at issue. Mr. C. is, therefore, to be credited for the remaining part of this article. Ed.

of the brain with the strictly intellectual acts, and of the propensities and sentiments with the upper and back parts of it. This connection, in favor of which he thinks there is strong probability, could not be discovered except by comparing the power of manifesting these mental powers with the condition of those parts of the brain; and why not pursue the same method into its more minute details? This is like a naturalist who should admit orders and genera, but refuse to inquire into characteristics of species and varieties, on the ground that this last investigation (although identical in its principles with that which had led him to make these admissions) appeared to him "to be liable to very considerable fallacies."

The imperfect and erroneous nature of the methods pursued in Reid and Stewart's philosophy, becomes apparent when contemplated in their results.

First, in regard to the *feelings*. Phrenologists admit that Reid and Stewart, and other metaphysical authors, have enumerated, under the head of the "active powers," a number of primitive desires and emotions, which are found to have organs in the brain; for instance, the love of offspring, the love of fame, the desire of society, and some others; but they observe, 1st, That no notice is taken by these authors of the influence of the condition of particular parts of the brain, on the vigor with which these and the other desires are experienced, and that this influence is so important that the mere enumeration of the emotions, without adverting to the organs, is no more entitled to be regarded as the science of mind, than observations on the revolutions of the planets considered apart from the laws of motion and gravitation are entitled to be called the science of astronomy; 2dly, That many desires and emotions are altogether omitted in their enumerations, such as the inclination to destroy, the tendency to conceal, the tendency to venerate, and others; 3dly, That the existence of the most important tendencies and emotions is a subject of dispute among them, while their principles of investigation afford no satisfactory means of settling the difference of opinion; for example, Mr. Stewart denies that the love of property is a primitive faculty of the mind, and ascribes avarice to association; he and Reid admit a benevolent affection, while Hobbes and others deny it; he and Brown admit a native sentiment of justice, while Mandeville, Hume and Paley reject it, and Sir James Mackintosh considers conscience as a compound result of many affections. While philosophers refer only to their own consciousness, they cannot settle these disputes satisfactorily; because some men are conscious, and others are not conscious, of the emotions. Even when they call in the aid of observation on the acts

of other men, they fail to arrive at certainty; because if the observer be deficient in the feeling himself, he does not easily recognize it in the acts of others, but is apt to ascribe their manifestations of it to other affections better known to himself; and, moreover, some men do, while others do not, manifest these feelings, so that two observers might report different results, and each adduce real instances in support of his conclusion.

By the phrenological method of observation, these difficulties are greatly diminished. Each student is informed that he has the strongest consciousness of those inclinations and emotions, the organs of which are largest in his own brain. If he be very deficient in the organ of Conscientiousness, he is warned that his own consciousness is not a trust-worthy index of the existence and strength of the feeling in other men. If he possess that organ large, then he is acquainted with the emotion, and he is capable of observing the presence or absence of its manifestations in other men. By comparing the size of a certain part of the brain with the vigor of this emotion, he may obtain demonstrative evidence of its existence. Cases of imperfect manifestation of it by some individuals, if found in connection with a deficiency in the organ, will become additional proofs of its existence, instead of operating as facts negative of its reality.

Secondly, in regard to the *intellectual faculties*. Professer Alison affirms that the phrenologists, in contending for the existence of different faculties of Form, Coloring, and others, merely use the term *faculty* in a different sense from that in which it is employed by Reid and Stewart. He says that Reid and Stewart described "distinctions among the acts of the mind themselves;" while the phrenologists, in the instances now mentioned, arrange the study according to the *objects* to which these acts are directed. There are much greater differences than these—the extent of which will again appear by the results. The phrenologists admit Perception, Conception, Memory, Imagination and Judgment, to be *acts* of the mind, but not faculties. What they mean by a faculty will be understood by taking the example of an organ. There is an organ of Coloring, for instance. When it is large and active, the individual is capable of perceiving, conceiving, remembering, and imagining colors, with vigor and facility; when it is slightly deficient, he is capable of perceiving and remembering them, but has little power of imagininating in regard to them—he could not, for instance, invent new combinations of them to enable him to paint unwonted appearances of colors in nature; when more deficient, he is capable only of perceivng, but not of remembering them; and when very deficient, he cannot even perceive them distinctly. When the organ is spontaneously active, he

conceives colors vividly; when it is stimulated by disease, he sees colors that have no outward existence. The same illustrations might be given in regard to the organs of Form, Number, and others. Now, what Reid and Stewart did was to describe the acts of perception, conception, memory, imagination, and judgment, in general, and *to call these faculties*. The extent of difference between this and the phrenological method of expounding the science of mind, admits of easy illustration.

Imagine one physiologist, when treating of secretion, to describe its mere general phenomena, and to mention that these are performed by the body in general; and another to proceed to an exposition of the stomach, as the organ which secretes the gastric juice, of the liver as that which secretes bile, and of the salivary glands as those which secrete saliva. Suppose the latter farther to point out the structure, modes of action, and relations of each of these organs, and to explain the effects of the state of it on its own peculiar secretions; suppose him also to describe the phenomena which are common to all these secreting organs, and to deduce general laws applicable to them all, but still to discriminate the peculiar functions, modes of action, and laws of each—which would have best unfolded the *science* of secretion? Undoubtedly the latter.

Again—suppose one philosopher to describe *sensation* as a general mental power, and the body as its organ; and another to distinguish each variety of sensation, to ascribe it to its own peculiar organ, and to expound the effect which the state of that organ had on the sensations connected with it—which of them would deserve the credit of having taught the *philosophy* of sensation? Assuredly the one who had expounded the particular organs. And would it not be more correct to apply the term *faculty* to each of the senses, than to use that word in reference to some general act performed alike by them all?

These cases are illustrations of the differences between the philosophy of the intellectual faculties taught by Reid and Stewart, and that expounded by Gall and Spurzheim, and their followers.

Farther—what opinion should we form of the physiologist who, having announced that secretion in general is performed by the body in general, should affirm that those who opposed this notion, and who had established distict organs of secretion, with distinct products, had merely classified the phenomena of secretion *according to their products*, and made *additions* to *his* system? We should admire his confidence more than his discrimination; yet this is parallel to the statement of Professor Alison, that Drs. Gall and Spurzheim have only classified the mental phenomena *according to their objects*, and made additions to the philosophy of Reid and Stewart. It would be necessary to "sweep away"

the whole doctrine of secretion being one general organ, before a single step could be made in establishing the sound philosophy of that function; and the same conclusion holds good in regard to the intellectual philosophy of Reid and Stewart.

The organs of the different faculties exist and produce their natural effects, and common language is full of expressions indicative of the existence and activity of the related faculties. For example, men speak of individuals as addicted to pride, to avarice, or to vanity; of others, as having talents for drawing, or for painting, or for mechanics, and so on; while other individuals are mentioned as being deficient in these powers. These facts have intruded themselves as it were into the writings of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, but they form no part of their philosophy. Indeed, they are excluded by that of Mr. Stewart. After enumerating Consciousness, Perception, Attention, Conception, &c., as intellectual powers, he adds: "Besides these intellectual faculties, which in some degree are common to the whole species, *there are other more complicated powers or capacities, which are gradually formed* BY PARTICULAR HABITS OF STUDY OR OF BUSINESS. *Such are the power of taste; a* GENIUS FOR POETRY, *for* PAINTING, *for* MUSIC, *for* MATHEMATICS; with all the intellectual *habits* acquired in the different professions of life."

According to the phrenological system, a genius for poetry depends on a fine temperament, combined with a large developement of certain parts of the brain. A genius for music depends on certain *other* parts being highly developed; and a genius for mathematics on still *other* parts being largely possessed; high temperaments being always added. According to Mr. Stewart's philosophy, these powers are not the gifts of nature, but are gradually formed by particular habits of study or of business. Nothing can be more dissimilar than these results, and the cause of this dissimilarity is to be found in the difference of the modes of philosophizing adopted by him and the phrenologists. He mistook mere general acts of all the intellectual faculties for faculties themselves. Perception, for instance, is the result of the lowest degree of activity in each of the phrenological organs devoted to intellect, such as Form, Coloring, Number, &c. Conception results from another mode of action in each of these; and Imagination from a third mode of action. But there is the same difference between these modes of action and the primitive faculties themselves, that there is between sensation, regarded as a general power, and vision, smell, and hearing, as particular faculties of sensation.

In point of fact, the philosophy of Conception, Perception, Memory, and Imagination, was not known until it was explained by phrenologists;

and so far was Mr. Stewart from being acquainted with it, that in his philosophical writings there is a confounding of primitive faculties with modes of action, and with the laws of their action, which proves that he had not attained to systematic views on the subject. The following sentence, which occurs in the very threshold of his Elements, affords a striking illustration of this remark: "Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own mind," says he, "they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena which appeared at first too various for our comprehension, are found to be the result of a small number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and uncompounded principles of action." It is extremely difficult to comprehend the *distinction* between "*faculties*" and "*principles of action*," which is obviously implied in the terms of this sentence. Mr. Stewart proceeds: "These *faculties and principles are the* GENERAL LAWS *of our constitution*, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind that the general laws we investigate in physics hold in that branch of science." This is evidently erroneous. The propensity of Destructiveness, for example, is a primitive faculty, and it acts according to certain laws. One of these laws is, that it is excited by injury or provocation; and that it lies dormant when its possessor is gratified. Under certain influences it may become diseased, and then it is a law of its constitution that it becomes extremely vigorous, and ungovernable by the other faculties, and that it adds greatly to the energy of muscular action. The propensity itself is a primitive faculty of our nature, and the phenomena which it exhibits take place regularly, and this regularity is metaphorically expressed by saying that it acts according to certain laws, which are called laws of our constitution; but there is a want of discrimination in mistaking the laws which the propensity observes, or its mode of action, for the propensity itself, which Mr. Stewart here obviously does. The same want of penetration is apparent in his remark in regard to the objects of our investigation in physical science. It is true, that in astronomy, the objects of our investigation are the *laws* which the principls of gravitation obeys; but in chemistry, which is equally a physical science, the elements and the inherent properties or qualities of substances, whatever these may be, are the ultimate objects of investigation, just as the primitive faculties are in mind. The modes of action of chemical substances, and the laws which they obey, are obviously distinct objects of study from the substances themselves. The mineralogist, for instance, studies the diamond, simply as it exists;

while the chemist investigates its elements, and its modes of action when exposed to heat and other external influences. Again, it has long been disputed, what *caloric* is in itself, whether it be a *substance*, or a *state* merely arising from certain modes of action in matter. But the laws which it obeys in being radiated, in being reflected, and in being concentrated, are clearly distinct objects of consideration from its substance, and yet Mr. Stewart confounds them. This incapacity to discriminate between primitive faculties and their modes of action, runs through almost all his writings. Sometimes he recognizes original principles distinctly, as in pp. 367, 371, 372. On other occasions, he loses sight of the distinction between them and modes of action.

Having thus stated the extent to which the philosophy of Dr. Gall will "sweep away" that of Reid and Stewart, and the differences between them, I revert to the reasons of Professor Alison "for not studying so carefully as perhaps he ought to have done," the evidence adduced by the phrenologists. He says, "Measurement of skulls, and comparison of these with the known characters of their owners, have always appeared to me to be liable to *very considerable fallacies*, affecting both the *physical* and the *mental* parts of these observations; and, therefore, to be inadequate to the purpose of fixing the size of the different portions of the brain, *unless supported and confirmed by other observations*. I can conceive them to derive that support and confirmation from three sources—from comparative anatomy—from the results of experiments on animals—and from the effects of injury or disease of individual portions of the brain in the human body. But, after taking some pains in the inquiry, I have come to this conclusion, that *from none of these sources of information is there any confirmation* of the special appropriation of the different parts of the brain to the different acts of mind, which the phrenologists consider as ascertained."

These reasons are not philosophical. It must either be, or not be, possible to compare the size and condition of different parts of the brain with the mental powers and dispositions manifested by individuals. If it be *possible*, the thing should be done, without regard to its deriving support and confirmation from any other source. Difficulty offers no apology for not doing it. Professor Alison, standing in the situation of a public teacher, seems bound, in duty to his pupils, to make reasonable efforts in order to ascertain whether so great an addition to human knowledge to his department as the discovery of the functions of different parts of the brain has in reality been made.

Phrenology is a science of observation, and the most rational, the most certain, and the most speedy way of ascertaining the real merits

of its pretensions is, for the inquirer to repeat the observations in the manner pointed out, after duly qualifying himself to do so. It is strange that there should be so great an aversion to follow this plain course in regard to phrenology. Dr. Roget proposed to inquire into the competency of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim to make their alledged discoveries, before he would put them to the test of observation; and now, Professor Alison abstains from studying the evidence, because it appears to him to be liable to "very considerable fallacies," unless supported by other observations. Phrenologists have never asked any one to admit their doctrines on the faith of their recorded cases, but have constantly said, appeal to nature. Professor Alison would have ascertained the truth of phrenology by appealing to nature in half the time that he has spent in arguing the question whether he should do so or not.

But I shall advert to the alledged sources of fallacy themselves.

The *first* element in the evidence in favor of phrenology, is, that the size of the different parts of the brain (the functions of which are described as ascertained) may be discovered during life. This, I presume, is the physical part of the fallacies. On this point I refer to the following authorities.

Magendie, in his Compendium of Physiology, says, that the "only way of estimating the *volume of the brain* in a living person, is to *measure the dimensions of the skull;* every other means, even that proposed by Camper, is uncertain."

Sir Charles Bell also observes, "that the bones of the head are moulded to the brain, and the peculiar shapes of the bones of the head are determined by the original peculiarity in the shape of the brain." Dr. Gordon likewise, in the 49th number of the Edinburgh Review, has the following words: "But we will acquiesce implicitly for the present in the proposition (familiar to physiologists long before the age of Gall and Spurzheim) that there is, in most instances, a general correspondence between the size of the cranium and the quantity of the cerebrum; that large heads usually contain large brains, and small heads small brains."

If the whole skull indicate correctly the size of the whole brain, it is not unreasonable to believe that the developement of different parts of it, with certain exceptions (which are stated by phrenologists) will indicate the size of the different parts of the brain.

2dly, As to the *mental* fallacies, by which I presume Professor Alison means the difficulty of ascertaining the real character of the individual observed, I have discussed this subject in my System of Phrenology, 4th edition, p. 85–7. But there is another answer, which Professor Alison will perhaps find more constringent. In the second

paragraph of his letter he says that the foundations of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart are "*inferences as to the mental acts of others*, as well as consciousness of mental actions in ourselves." The words here in italics must mean that the philosophy of Reid and Stewart is founded partly on observations made on the mental acts of other men. If such observations be competent to afford a foundation for their philosophy, why is the same practice liable to very considerable fallacies when resorted to by phrenologists?

Professor Alison states, however, as a further apology for not studying the evidence, that the conclusions drawn by the phrenologists derive no support or confirmation "from comparative anatomy—from the results of experiments on animals—from the effects of injury or disease of individual portions of the brain." I beg leave to offer a few observations on each of these topics.

1st, As to Comparative Anatomy. Cuvier, speaking of the cerebral lobes being the place "where all the sensations take a distinct form, and leave durable impressions," adds, "L'anatomie comparee en offre un autre confirmation dans la proportion constante du volume de ces lobes avec le degre d'intelligence des animaux."—(Report to the French Institute in 1822 on the Experiments of Flourens.) And it is elsewhere stated by the same eminent naturalist, that "*certain parts* of the brain, in all classes of animals, are *large or small* according to *certain qualities* of the animals."—(Anat. Comp. tom. ii.) This is pretty strong authority; to which more might be added. The general conclusions from comparative anatomy in the brain are ably stated in the 94th number of the Edinburgh Review: "It is in the nervous system alone that we can trace a gradual progress in the provision for the subordination of one (animal) to another, and of all to man; and are enabled to associate every faculty which gives superiority with some addition to the nervous mass, even from the smallest indications of sensation and will, up to the highest degree of sensibility, judgment, and expression. The brain is observed progressively to be improved in its structure, and, with reference to the spinal marrow and nerves, augmented in volume more and more, until we reach the human brain, each addition being marked by some addition to, or amplification of, the powers of the animal—until in man we behold it possessing some parts of which animals are destitute, and wanting none which theirs possess."

Is Professor Alison acquainted with Dr. Vimont's "Treatise on Human and Comparative Phrenology?" In that work Dr. Vimont delineates, in plates possessing the highest qualities of fidelity and beauty, the brains and skulls of a variety of animals, and points out the

connexion between particular parts and particular instincts or powers. Professor Alison will probably treat this work with contempt because Dr. Vimont is a phrenologist. Dr. Vimont, however, was an anti-phrenologist until he made the investigations which he has now published; and it was Nature that forced him to change his opinions. Farther, his plates are visible and tangible; the brains and skulls of the animals delineated are easibly accessible; and their instincts are, in many particulars, generally acknowledged. On what principle of reason, then, Professor Alison is entitled to avert his eyes and his understanding from such facts; and, without being able to affirm that they are erroneous, to allege that they afford no confirmation of the appropriation of different faculties to different parts of the brain?

Professor Alison proceeds: "Indeed, as to comparative anatomy, you must probably be aware, that the result of observations in that science goes completely to disprove the idea, that any fixed relation exists in the different tribes of animals, between the degree of intelligence that can be observed in them, and the size or complexity of structure, *or indeed any circumstance of structure* that has yet been pointed out in their brains."

My information on this subject is very different. Desmoulins and Magendie state that in numerous examinations of the brains of almost every genus of the mammalia, they found a nearly constant relation between the extent of surface presented by the brain in each genus, and the amount of intelligence displayed by it. When differences occur in one of these points, differences are stated to be usually found in the other, not only between genera, but between different species of the same genus, and also between different individuals of the same species. Professor Tiedemann of Heidelberg, in his work on the Brains of Apes and of some other animals, has accurately delineated and described the progressive diminution and final disappearance of the folds of the brain in the mammalia, from the Apes down to the Rodentia; and, according to Desmoulins, this progression corresponds exactly with the diminution of intelligence. The most striking difference exists between the apes of the old world and those of the new. Many of the former are capable of being trained and employed for useful purposes, while the latter are incapable of instruction, and scarcely exceed squirrels in the degree of their intelligence. This corresponds with the state of the convolutions. In some dogs, especially those employed in hunting, the convolutions are scarcely less numerous and deep than in the higher tribes of apes; while in the less intelligent species, and in wolves, they exist in a much inferior degree of developement. Every one must have been struck by

the great difference as to docility observable between dogs and cats; an equally striking difference is found in the appearances presented by the number and depth of the convolutions of their brains—a difference so great that Desmoulins estimates the convolutions of the dog to exceed by six or eight times those of the cat. The paucity of convolutions found in the cat prevails throughout the entire genus to which it belongs. That genus, Felis, which includes the cat, lion, tiger, panther, and other animals of a similar nature, is likewise remarkable for the *uniformity* observed in the number and arrangements of the convolutions in the different species; and in no genus are the species more distinguished for similarity of disposition, for through none do the faculties of Secretiveness and Destructiveness prevail in so extreme a degree of strength.

Sir Charles Bell observes: "When we compare the structure of the brain in different animals, we find that in certain lower classes there are no convolutions; the surface of the cineritious matter is uniform. As we ascend in the scale of beings, we find the extent of the cineritious matter increased. To admit of this, it is convoluted, and the depth of the sulci is the consequence of the extension of the great cineritious mass; and in man above all other animals are the convolutions numerous and the sulci deep, and consequently the cineritious mass, and its extension of surface, far beyond that of all other creatures."

Farther—I have pointed out to hundreds of students the difference between the skulls of the carniverous and herbiverous animals; between the tiger and the sheep; between the cat, dog, and fox, and the doe; and between the cat and the hare, in the region immediately above and behind the ear, the situation of the organs of Destructiveness and Secretiveness. The parts are so much larger in the carniverous than in the herbiverous animals, that it is almost impossible to fail in perceiving the differences, unless the eyes be utterly blinded by prejudice. I have exhibited also the difference between the skull of the beaver and that of the dog and fox in the region of Constructiveness. Does Professor Alison deny these facts; or has he only not attended to them? They assuredly afford some confirmation of the appropriation of different parts of the brain to different instincts in these animals.

Finally on this topic; Professor Alison admits that there are reasonable grounds for ascribing the intellect to the anterior lobe, and the feelings to the posterior and upper regions of the brain. *Quæritur*, Where did he find the evidence for this opinion? The method of direct comparison of size with manifestation is liable, he says, to "very considerable fallacies," and he has never practised it; while comparative anatomy, according to him, "goes completely to disprove the idea that any relation

exists between the degree of intelligence and any circumstance of size or structure in the brain." If these sources of information be excluded, it will be difficult for him to shew the reasonableness of the admission which he is disposed to make.

3dly, The next reason assigned by Professor Alison for not studying the evidence adduced by Gall and Spurzheim and their followers is, that their conclusions are not supported by "the results of experiments on animals." On this topic I shall simply refer to the following report of a discourse delivered by Sir Charles Bell before the Anatomical Section of the British Association, which appeared in the Scotsman newspaper of the 13th September, 1834.

"On Thursday and Friday there was a numerous attendance in the Anatomical Section, when Sir Charles Bell gave an interesting exposition of his views of the nervous system. He was the first to demonstrate what other physiologists had previously conjectured to be probable, viz. the existence of separate nerves of motion and of sensation. His statement was a recapitulation of his publication, and we did not observe that he added any new facts. In several particulars we were gratified by his exposition, as marking the certain, although slow, progress of truth. Dr. Spurzheim, when he visted Edinburgh in 1816, maintained that the uses of the brain could not be philosophically ascertained by mutilations of the brains of animals; but he was ridiculed for saying so, and it was asserted that this was one of his numerous back-doors for escaping from adverse evidence. Flourens and Magendie in France, Sir William Hamilton here, and various other individuals have, in the interval, performed numerous experiments on the brains of the lower creatures, and published results which have been extensively cited as evidence against phrenology. Yesterday, Sir Charles Bell explicitly stated, that he also had made such experiments, and had obtained no satisfactory results; and he then shewed why he had failed, and why all other experimenters must fail who pursue this method of inquiry. These experiments always, and necessarily, involve a great shock to the nervous system in general, and cannot be confined in their effects to the parts cut out. We may add—If we do not know what office the part performs in health, how can we know whether the function has ceased *in consequence of* the ablation or not? It may be true, that if we were to cut out the organ of Tune from the brain of a canary, the bird would never sing again; but if, in ignorance of what part is that organ, we were to cut out any other portion of the brain, with a view to discover it, we should be disappointed; because, whatever part we injured, the effect on its singing would always be the the same; it would cease to

sing, for the obvious reason that singing and a mangled brain are not compatible in nature. We rejoiced to hear this method of investigation renounced and condemned by so great an authority."

4thly, The last reason of Professor Alison for not studying the evidence is, that the results derive no support or confirmation from "the effects of injury or disease of individual portions of the brain." Such a statement could proceed only from a person who had confined his reading to the report of non-phrenological or of anti-phrenological authors. In the Phrenological Journal, as well as in other phrenological publications, there are many well authenticated cases, shewing that these results receive the strongest confirmation and support from the effects of disease or injury of individual portions of the brain. Among the testimonials which I had the honor of presenting to the Town Council of Edinburgh in June and July, 1836, when I became a candidate for the Logic Chair, are several from physicians to lunatic asylums, who testify in direct opposition to the assumption made by Professor Alison. Sir W. C. Ellis, superintendent of the asylum at Hanwell, says: "It is unnecessary for him to inform Mr. Combe that, residing amongst 600 lunatics, no day passes over in which the truth of Phrenology is not exemplified." Dr. James Scott, surgeon to the Royal Hospital at Haslar, and medical superintendent of the Royal Naval Lunatic Asylum, says "As I have been for nearly ten years the medical attendant of the Lunatic Asylum in this great hospital, my opportunities, at least, of observing have been great indeed; and a daily intercourse with the unfortunate individuals entrusted to my care and management (whose number has never been less that thirty persons, and often many more) has firmly, because experimentally, convinced me that mental disorder and moral delinquency can be rationally combated *only* by the application of Phrenology." H. A. Galbraith, Esq., surgeon to the Glasgow Lunatic Asylum, says: "Situated as I am in the midst of a wide field for observation, more particularly in regard to disordered mental manifestations, I have been for several years past led to compare these with the phrenological developement of the individuals in whom they appeared; and from the result of numerous and well-marked instances, which have not only been known to me during a state of morbid activity, but from authentic accounts of the previous mental indications, I have not the least hesitation in declaring my firm belief in the general principles of phrenology." Many other certificates to a similar purport were brought forward by me on that occasion, and copies of the whole of them were presented by me to Professor Alison. I do not say that he was bound on that evidence to embrace phrenology; but, with all

deference, these testimonials render his statement that the results of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim's investigations derive *no* confirmation from "the effects of injury or *disease* of individual portions of the brain," not entirely credible, and scarcely leave him an adequate apology on this ground for delaying to "study the evidence" by a direct appeal to nature.

While, however, Professor Alison practices a boundless caution and incredulity in regard to every fact, argument and doctrine brought forward by phrenologists, these mental qualities appear to forsake him when he considers facts, doctrines, or experiments brought forward by persons adverse to the science. He disbelieves in the cerebellum being the organ of Amativeness, because this is affirmed by Dr. Gall, and he believes in its office being to regulate "muscular motions," because this is asserted by Magendie and Flourens. I venture to ask him whether, in forming these opinions, he has read and candidly weighed the evidence adduced by Dr. Gall in his "Physiologie du Cerveau" on this point, and given due weight to the observations of Sir Charles Bell on the effects of mutilations of the brain, in considering the experiments of Flourens and Magendie? He knows that the nature of the details given by Gall prevents the phrenologists from printing them in merely popular works; but as a scientific enquirer he was bound to consider them in their original records. My suspicion is, that he has omitted "to study the evidence adduced by Gall and Spurzheim and their followers on this subject so carefully as perhaps he ought to have done," and by this supposition alone is it possible to account for his rejecting the one and embracing the other opinion. Dr. Broussais, in his lecture on the functions of the cerebellum, reported in the *Lancet* of 30th July, 1836, accounts in a manner that appears to me satisfactory, for the effects of mutilations of the cerebellum on muscular motion, in perfect consistency with the functions ascribed to that organ by Dr. Gall.

Professor Alison remarks that "a book on intellectual or moral philosophy going in a few years through many editions, may be safely set down as a very superficial book." The same might be said of a book on any other science; yet Sir John Herschel's Discourse on Natural Philosophy has gone through many editions in a few years, and it is generally regarded as being a very profound and able work. Superficiality alone will not render a book on any subject acceptable to numerous readers: there must be something more. If the work address itself to strong existing prejudices, it may be temporarily successful and yet superficial. Beattie's Essay on Truth, as contrasted with Hume's Essays, is an example in point. But if a work oppose public opinion,

if its author enjoyed no previous or extrinsic reputation, if it have been combated and dissected by men of the first talents, and if, nevertheless, it have constantly advanced in estimation and circulation, the conclusion does not inevitably follow that its success has been owing entirely to its superficiality. It *may* have advocated important truths in so clear and forcible a manner as to have interested numerous reflecting men, and on this account have been successful.

Professor Alison is pleased to conclude by expressing his opinion that "the injudicious pretensions of the present supporters of phrenology will ultimately be fatal to the personal reputation of most of our present phrenological authors." As I have the misfortune to be one of these authors, my remarks on this sentence must be received with due qualification; but as he has raised a question of *pretensions*, I leave the public to judge whether his condemnation, uttered avowedly without having studied the evidence, betokens greater or less modesty than my asseverations in favor of certain propositions, *after* having examined the proofs. Allowing for a great superiority in genius, perspicacity, and learning, on the side of Professor Alison, the study of the *evidence* may be reasonably allowed to add *something* to the probabilities of my assertions being true. This point, however, the public alone are competent to settle. It is probably that the contests which are now maintained on this subject, may ultimately prove fatal to the reputation either of the phrenological authors or of their opponents—*which* is more likely to suffer, it is not my province to decide. If I look forward with confidence to the ultimate decision, it is, *first*, because I *have*, in all humility and with all assiduity, *studied the evidence* adduced on the subject, and have endeavored, so far as in me lay, to advance no opinions which are not warranted by evidence; and, *secondly*, because I find that the more narrowly intelligent inquirers have examined into the facts, they are disposed to recognize the greater extent of truth in the doctrines which I advocate. All individuals who have examined them, entertain a more favorable opinion of these arguments than Professor Alison, who has not seen reason to do so. The history of science has presented some examples of men opposing great and important discoveries, whose reputations were not advanced in the estimation of posterity by such applications of their talents. A writer in the 94th number of the Edinburgh Review, alluding to the opponents of Harvey, says: "The discoverer of the circulation of the blood—a discovery which, if measured by its consequences on physiology and medicine, was the greatest ever made since physic was cultivated—suffers no diminution of his reputation in our day, from the incredulity with which his doctrine was received by some, the effrontery

with which it was claimed by others, or the knavery with which it was attributed to former physiologists, by those who could not deny, and would not praise, it. The very names of these envious and dishonest enemies of Harvey are scarcely remembered; and the honor of this great discovery now rests, beyond all dispute, with the great philosopher who made it." If the great doctrines of phrenology as now taught shall be approved of by competent judges who *have* studied the evidence, posterity will probably be disposed to pronounce a similar judgment on the merits of those who have rejected and opposed them. If the doctrines, when thus tried, shall be found at variance with Nature, the reputation of all phrenological authors will most deservedly vanish.

Finally: in judging of the merits of living phrenological authors, it is necessary to keep in view to what their pretensions relate. They maintain that Dr. Gall has discovered the functions of many particular parts of the brain, and that this discovery is of great importance in medicine and mental science. They offer to his memory the homage of a profound and sincere admiration, on account of his having made this valuable addition to human knowledge; and affirm that those individuals whose duty it is to study the evidence of his discovery and apply it, but who neglect to do so, are not deserving of esteem for this omission; but here their pretensions stop. They claim no merit in the discovery for themselves, they boast of no superiority of talents or of general learning over their adversaries; on the contrary, they allow to them every possible advantage on these points, and limit their own pretensions to the humble merit of having observed and interrogated nature on this subject, while their more gifted opponents, in the pride of their own greatness, have closed their understandings against "evidence" which obtrudes on their attention. To have pretended to less, would have been traitors to the cause of truth; that they have pretended to more, is an unjust accusation against them.

ARTICLE II.

PHRENOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF MRS. L. M. CHILD,

Author of Hobomok, The Rebels, The Mother's Book, The Girl's Book, The Frugal Housewife, Philothea, Appeal for that class of Americans called Africans, &c., &c. —Given by L. N. Fowler, July 7th, 1841.

From curiosity Mrs. Child visited Mr. Fowler's office in New York, as a perfect stranger. He had no means whatever of conjecturing her

name or character, and not a word was spoken by her until after the examination of her head was completed and the following results written down:—This lady's temperament is a predominance of the nervous, and indicates great mental activity. She is capable of much intellectual exertion—more so than physical. Her thoughts and feelings are intense and vivid. She has a positive character, and a self-directing mind. Her mind does not run in channels with other persons; her thoughts are not others' thoughts. The leading points of her character are perseverance, ambition, friendship, powers of reason, and ability to retain information. Her selfish faculties have comparatively an inferior influence. She is whole-souled in every thing she attempts; is half way in nothing. She is *very* strongly attached to her friends, and is at times too much influenced by her friendships. Her tastes are decidedly social and domestic; and she has strong connubial love and affection. It is unnecessary to go into details; it is sufficient to remark that this head indicates a combination of qualities peculiarly calculated to confer and enjoy domestic happiness. She likes the society of men better than that of women, and feels more interest in the subjects on which they converse. At no period of her life has she ever enjoyed womens' society so highly as that of intelligent and cultivated men. She has strong attachment to place and home; would like to live in one place, and have her own room, with books and accustomed conveniences about her; is homesick among strangers, and does not enjoy rest and food so well when absent from home. She takes a deep interest in the welfare of children, and as a parent, would be most devoted. She would be naturally fond of teaching children, and helping them wherever they happened to come under her observation. Her sympathies are very easily excited by distress, and she is always ready to lend a helping hand; yet Love of Justice is more largely developed than Benevolence. She would like to know whether the beggar made false pretensions, or was impoverished by his own vices. She enjoys herself with a book and pen more than in household arrangements, or general society. She can and will discharge the every day duties of life, as a matter of conscience, and to promote the happiness of the family; but inclination would not lead her to do it. She would prefer to hire some one to do her household work for her. She has fair conceptions of order and arrangement; but, somehow or another, her things "wont stay put." She likes method in household affairs, but is not old-maidish or fastidious in this respect. She has more mental than physical arrangement; this shows itself in a clear and orderly manner of expressing her thoughts. She has a fair appetite, yet easily controlled. She eats to live, and does not live to eat. If I mistake

not, she sometimes wishes it were possible to live without eating, considering it a waste of time. She places little value on property, as such, but wants money to use, not to hoard up. At times, the influence of Acquisitiveness is not sufficient to control her other faculties. She is much more prudent in the use of money, than anxious to acquire it. She dislikes the trouble of pecuniary details, and would prefer to have another arrange them for her; but she is cautious in expenditure. Her maxim is, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." She would prefer a small, certain income to magnificent chances; would rather make sure of the one dollar she has, than risk it to obtain more. She has great resolution, spirit, and force; does not stop at trifles; and is always ready to defend herself and the cause she advocates. She is *very* firm, determined, and persevering. There is a good deal of General Jackson about her in this one particular. She has more than an ordinary degree of moral courage; is never afraid to defend what she thinks right; speaks in unqualified terms of any thing she considers morally wrong; and is a severe critic upon those who violate principles. The strongest trait in her moral character is love of justice. She would rather avoid opposition and difficulty, if possible; but fearlessly defends what she thinks true, regardless of consequences—having faith that they will take care of themselves. She is radical in her notions; does not go by old landmarks; is not satisfied with the world as it is, and has more than an ordinary degree of ambition to turn over a new leaf, and bring about moral, social, and intellectual reforms. Her hopes and anticipations are strong, yet never get the better of her judgment. Ambition is more likely to lead her astray than Hope. Combativeness is large. I know not whether it has been exercised in scolding; but in some way or other this faculty has been active. She takes no pleasure in cruelty, and never retains malice. She may feel indignant, and wish the object of her displeasure out of the way, but she is sarcastic only when occasion requires, and never takes pleasure in giving pain to gratify her temper. She is rather cautious, but never hypocritical in her movements. She looks a great ways a head; always consults consequences, and is not easily ensnared in difficulties for want of judgment. She values her character very highly; from a child, was always ambitious to excel in some department. Her ambition would be likely to take an intellectual or moral turn. As a scholar, she was probable very desirous of being No. 1. In all that she does, she feels as though the eye of the public was upon her, and has strict reference to the influence she exerts; she never felt retired, and as if she had no influence. She cannot bear exposure, and is grieved at being found fault with by her friends. She

has sufficient Self-esteem to produce dignity without pride. She is not aristocratic and reserved, but social and familiar, frank and open-hearted. She enjoys herself best when she can throw off restraint, and express thought and feeling in a free and easy manner. She is very direct and plain-spoken: utters herself with great clearness and distinctness, and never mystifies what she has to say. She can convey her ideas better with the pen than in conversation. She may be rapid, but not copious, in the use of language. She has a mind capable of a high degree of discipline. She can connect her thoughts and feelings as long as circumstances require, but is not tedious and prolix. Some persons, who have the faculty, weary their hearers with minuteness of detail; it is not so with her. She has a clear, discriminating, analogical mind, capable of tracing a subject from beginning to end; can reason connectedly, both from analogy and from cause to effect. She is very open to conviction, desirous of improvement, and always learning. She has naturally an excellent memory of what she reads, and of historical accounts; more theoretical than practical talent; better judgment of principles than knowledge of facts and details. She is fond of discussion and philosophical investigation. Her mind is better adapted to the study of literature and mental philosophy, than to the natural and exact sciences. Her reflective faculties have been developed at the expense of her perceptive. She thinks more than she observes. She is not incredulous, but readily receives moral impressions; is rather spiritually minded, and is devotional and respectful toward every thing *she* considers holy; yet much that others regard as sacred, appears to her in a ludicrous light. She may, perhaps, make fun of many of the religious notions of the day, because they appear to her perfectly absurd. She enjoys a joke, and has a quick perception of the ridiculous and the incongruous. She is fond of poetry, but her poetical feelings are not of the extravagant and bombastic kind; she peculiarly appreciates poetry of the affections and sentiments. Her imagination is strong and vivid. She has a correct idea of proportion and outline, and a very strong love of the beautiful, both in nature and art. She can copy drawings, and work after any pattern. She has a great versatility of talent, and is seldom at a loss for means to accomplish her ends.

ARTICLE III.

ON THE STUDY OF HUMAN NATURE AS A BRANCH OF POPULAR EDUCATION

(Continued from page 513.)

But some one will say that this view of our existing means of knowledge is a partial one; that an important item in the list has been omitted; and that, after all, the reformation may not be so urgently required as we have represented. Do we not (we shall be asked) make up in after life for these alledged deficiences in our earlier training. Experience is worth more than precept, and he who would be practically master of these subjects, will do better to exercise his common sense upon the open pages of the world, than to pour over the sealed volumes of the schools. To all this we answer by putting the same question to our objectors. Will the engineer whose reliance is thus confident on common sense to guide him in his intercourse with man, in his notions of education, politics, &c., give equal confidence to the same guide in his own profession? Will he tell his pupil that he had better study languages, and botany, and chemistry; but that for mathematics and all that, he may trust to his own untaught common sense, when he comes to the practice of his profession? Does the sailor trust to common sense in navigation, the general in the art of war, the antiquarian in detecting medals, or decyphering manuscripts, or the physician in the treatment of disease? They may require, they do require it in their practice, but they require also more; they know that a systematic thorough knowledge of all that can be taught of their several professions is the first thing to be gained; that this is the material on which common sense must operate, and that without this knowledge, common sense is, indeed, what the satirist has called it, the least common of the senses. Each may rely on their blind guide for the paths of which he himself is ignorant, but no one of them will trust to his guidance in his own. All men, in fact, on those subjects where they are qualified to be judges, decide at once for regular, in preference to accidental teaching; and the inference is plain, that no consent, however universal, of men who on any one point are not judges, to set aside the principle in that instance, can have weight to reverse the sentence. We apply the inference to the study of Human Nature. Those who know nothing of it, may not be aware how much better it is to teach it systematically, than to leave it to be learnt or not by each pupil, as the case may be: but those who have devoted themselves to it, (and it is their opinion we must take) determine otherwise. With them, the amount to be acquired is great, and training, careful and long-continued, insisted on as necessary for its acquisition. Some may do much without

it, others little with it. This is not the point. We do not profess by education to create, but only to improve and cultivate. There are very few too low for improvement; but beyond this point, there are none to whom teaching is not serviceable. The highest talents will be raised by education; and every degree of talent will be only the better raised by it, in proportion to the completeness and system with which it is communicated. Like every other branch of science, the philosophy of man to be generally understood, must be regularly taught, or our present amount of teaching fails to attain its object. The reform is needed: the only question is, how it may be best effected.

By the philosophical mind, nothing is ever ascribed to chance. Every effect is referred to its antecedent; and the only way proposed for altering or confirming it, is to ascertain, and act upon the circumstances which have produced it. If in the physical world derangements happen, the first step to be taken towards their remedy, is to learn their cause—the second to remove it. The case is the same in the moral world. Before attempting a reform, we must see clearly where it is to begin; in other words, we must account for its necessity, assign to each abuse its cause, and then proceed to its correction. Any hastier procedure is empirical, and must fail of accomplishing its object.

Why, then, we ask, have these studies been hitherto so little thought of in our schemes of education? It cannot be that their pursuit is an unnecessary, and therefore useless tax on the attention of our scholars. We have seen already that their results, if rightly gained, must, from the very nature of the case, be the foundation of all our practical sciences in regard to man; that they are, in fact, to all, in their capacity as men and citizens, what geology is to the miner, mathematics to the engineer, or natural philosophy to the machinist: that without them, a man is no more qualified to the full discharge of his public and private duties, than a blacksmith would be to his business, if he had not learnt the qualities of iron, or the uses of the forge; and that to be thoroughly acquainted with them, regular, and not accidental teaching, is as much required as in any other branch of education. Can it then be the case that this is a department which admits of no such thing as thorough knowledge, which cannot be reduced to system, or elevated to the rank of science? To judge from the expressions of a large class, even of our educated men, one might almost conclude it to be so. We hear of anti-theorists, *practical men* par-excellence, why reject all systematic views of human nature, all far-fetched references to general principles, and who look only to experience, (that is to say, their own experience) for direction in every emergency. We see these men trusted by the many as safe counsellors,

while the few, whose decisions are given on more general grounds, whose experience is more extensive, who are in fact the more practical, because the more philosophical and better informed class, are set aside by these empirics, and disqualified for credit by the magical name of theorists. To conduct a chemical analysis, we select the practised and educated chemist, not the babbler, whose knowledge consists only of a few crude notions, picked up accidentally; for the superintendence of a canal or rail-road, we require a thorough engineer, not a common road-surveyor; why are we not consistent throughout? Theory is the result of long experience, properly expressed. On every other subject we insist on its necessity; why should this be the exception? Is man the single object in creation whose nature is incapable of systematic description? We are fond of exulting in his superiority over other beings. Surely this is not the quality in which his superiority consists. We must look to some other cause for an explanation of our inconsistency.

Are we then to ascribe it to the incapacity of those who have made the effort to remove it, to a general want of ability in the mental and moral philosophers of our schools? Successful or unsuccessful in their effort, there cannot be a doubt that, as a class, they have been, to say the least, equal to any other of our literati. If "the race had been to the swift, or the battle to the strong," they must have won it. Why then have they failed? Some say they have not failed, that they have interested and improved themselves by their pursuits, and that if others have slighted their speculations, the fault lies with the public, not with them. We answer, that, with such a subject, not to have interested others is to have failed. It cannot be that the true philosophy of man has been so long and so well presented to intelligent men, and so long neglected by them as useless. Are any of the physical sciences thus treated? Is there one in ten of those who read the metaphysics of the schools, who ever give them a thought in after-life? The sentence of the literary world has been long given, and is past recall. The whole system is a failure, not indeed from want of power in its supporters, but from radical defects in its own construction. To ensure success, able men must labor in the right way. In this case, able men have failed, and the fault is to be attributed, not to themselves, nor to their subject, but to their mode of operation.

If we refer to history we shall find abundant confirmation of this view. Before the time of Bacon, there was the same confusion in the physical, as we now find in the moral sciences;* and the explanation of that

* We have spoken here and in other passages, of the sciences, as divided into physical and moral; meaning by the former, those which inquire into external nature,

confusion, which that philosopher arrived at, and by means of which he was led to the reform he effected in regard to it, was precisely that which we now offer for the still remaining confusion of the other branch of knowledge. "Whence," he asks, "can arise such vagueness and sterility in all the physical systems which have hitherto existed in the world? It is not, certainly, from any thing in nature itself; for the steadiness and regularity of the laws by which it is governed, clearly mark them out as objects of certain and precise knowledge. Neither can it arise from any want of ability in those who have pursued such inquiries, many of whom have been men of the highest talent and genius, of the ages in which they lived; and it can, therefore, arise from nothing else but the perverseness and insufficiency of the methods that have been pursued." Substitute the word "moral" for "physical," in this extract, and we have the authority of Bacon for our inference.

and by the latter, those which embody our knowledge of our own. The expressions thus used, though common, and on the score of brevity, convenient, are not, however, perfectly correct. Mackintosh has perhaps best defined them; though not in ordinary and frequently even in philosophical language, his distinction between them is not preserved. The physical sciences, he tells us, are those which answer the question, "*what is?*" the moral sciences, those which tell "*what ought to be.*" In this sense, Anatomy, Physiology, and Phrenology, (properly so called) all rank with the physical sciences, as much as Botany, or Chemisty. Anatomy tells us *what is* the conformation of the body; Physiology, *what is* the use of its several parts; Phrenology, *what is* the constitution of the mind. On these are based the strictly moral sciences connected with man. Hygiene, for instance, is the doctrine of *what ought to be* the condition; Ethics, of *what ought to be* his feeling and judgment of right and wrong; Natural Theology, of *what ought to be* his religious feelings and perceptions; the philosophy of Taste is the statement of *what ought to be* his perception of the beautiful; Logic, of *what ought to be* his perception of truth and error. The number of the moral sciences thus belonging to Anthropology, is, it will be seen, considerable, and no small portion of them have not commonly been otherwise classed. Even this definition of the term "moral," however, is open to objections. Some other word would be preferable. In nothing, indeed, has science generally been so defective, as in its nomenclature and classification. Phrenology has effected in the physical department of the science of the human mind, the reform which the Linnæan system has introduced in Botany. It has given significant names to all the faculties yet ascertained, and it has arranged them in practical and obvious principle. Its operation has to be extended further. The several moral inquiries founded on it, must be classed and named according to the faculties to whose action they have reference. The limits of a note, however, are insufficient for more than a hint on this point.

In the text, as we have observed, the laxity of the more popular language has been allowed; the true distinction between the term "physical" and "moral" being immaterial as regards the matter there discussed. It would be more correct, though less convenient, to substitute "anthropological" for the latter, and the "sciences relative to external nature," for the former.

The same high authority which thus determines the cause of our past failures, furnishes us also with the means of avoiding their recurrence. "As things are at present conducted," he observes, (still speaking of the natural philosophers of his own time, and using language in regard to them which may easily be referred to the mental philosophers of our own,) "as things are at present conducted, a sudden transition is made from sensible objects and particular facts to general propositions, which are accounted principles, and which, as round so many fixed poles, disputation and argument continually revolve. From the propositions thus hastily assumed, all things are derived, by a process compendious, and precipitate, ill suited to discovery, but wonderfully accommodated to debate. The way that promises success, is the reverse of this. It requires that we should generalize slowly, going from particular things to those which are but one step more general; from these to others of still greater extent, and so on to such as are universal. By such means we may hope to arrive at principles, not vague and obscure, but luminous and well-defined, such as nature herself would not refuse to acknowledge."

We say, then, that the present state of the sciences which treat immediately of man, is precisely that which, according to Bacon, characterized the sciences of external nature in his time. Our comparatively fashionable systems of human nature at once vague in their details, and barren in their results; their supporters, though few in number, are yet men of the highest talent, and their failure to work out a clear, precise, and practical system from the abundant materials which nature offers them, is a result of the insufficiency of the mode they have adopted in their operations. This insufficiency can be illustrated only by entering somewhat into detail.

In the first place, then, a large portion of our philosophers have given a wrong direction to their inquiries. They regard all science as an *explanation* of the phenomena of nature, and therefore aim at *explaining* by their systems the phenomena of man. Now, in one sense of the word "*explain*," this definition is correct, in another, it is not so. Natural philosophy may be said to explain the fall of an apple, or astronomy the revolution of the planets, by referring to the laws of gravitation; but when this reference has been made and admitted, what more do we know of the *real cause* or *nature* of the phenomenon than we did before? Nothing. The natural philosopher will tell us, and tell us rightly, that his science cannot *explain* the fact in this way; that it collects and analyzes particular facts to arrange them under general laws, but that the essential nature of the objects presented to its scrutiny,

as well as of the proximate cause of the changes to which they are subject, it knows, and can know, nothing. Thus the chemist arranges, by an analysis of their qualities, certain objects under the class of acids, and another yet under that of alkalies; and he tells us the general law that their combination with one another produces a certain result, which he describes and names. But if you ask him to *explain* the qualities of either, or the fact of their neutralizing one another, he cannot do it. He can go no further than his facts. Analysis and classification are the whole explanation he can offer. The case is the same in every other department. The grass grows, water finds its level, heat is communicated from one body to another; we can collect and arrange the facts of nature, on all these points, and speak of general laws, and so on; but this is the limit of our science. We can in no single instance, strictly speaking, *explain* the laws, and we therefore wisely turn our attention elsewhere, and labor only to learn and apply them.

Do our mental philosophers observe this distinction? We find them, for example, at variance among themselves, in regard to the nature of the mind. One class insists on its immateriality, the other argues its dependance on material organization, and each denounces the other as the holder of a fearful heresy. Suppose, now, that our naturalists were to give their attention to the discussion whether vegetable life is a result of an immaterial principle, or of material organs, and were to neglect the study of the organs themselves, and of the various plants which exhibit them, where would be their science? The answer may be drawn from history. The time has been when they did thus act, and the science of botany dates from the period when they reversed their procedure. So it is with the philosophy of man. We can know no more of the immateriality of the mind, than we can of the materiality of the body, and that is nothing. The naturalist can tell us neither *what matter is*, nor *how* its changes are produced; neither can the metaphysician define *mind*, or account for its phenomena. Both must collect their facts, and keep to them soberly. Any theory, on whatever subject, which pretends to more than an arrangement of facts, is a useless exercise of human ingenuity, not a valuable contribution to human science.

Again—our students of human nature are in many respects much too hasty and partial in their conclusions. They go too much on a principle of subdivision, separating from one another connected branches of knowledge, and assigning their prosecution to particular classes. Thus our educationists and politicians seldom look for any system of philosophy, intellectual, moral, or religious, by which to estimate their plans for

human improvement or government. Even our moralists and theologians, so called, too frequently frame their systems without reference to those collected facts which throw light on the mental constitution, and which ought, therefore, to form the basis of their speculations. The mental philosopher, in return, takes no thought, in his inquiries, of the wants of his fellow-laborers, who should be building on his foundation, and for whom he should be collecting the material. Nay, among those whose pursuits are confined to what may be termed the *physical* or *natural* departments of the science of man, in contradistinction to its speculative and practical departments, there is found the same disunion and indifference to one another's studies. The anatomist pursues his process of distinguishing between and naming the several portions of the body, without reference to the physiologist, whose province is to ascertain their uses. The phyiologist, again, inquires diligently into the functions of the body generally, its bones, muscles, blood-vessels, &c.; he even goes so far as to analyze its system, its powers of voluntary motion, and of sensation; but, beyond this, generally speaking, he does not venture. From nerves of voluntary motion, to nervous organs for the mental feelings, from nerves of sense, to nervous organs for the intellectual powers, is an easy and natural gradation; but he does not take the step. The physiology of the brain is left in obscurity, and the philosophy of the mind is consigned to the metaphysical observer. He in return, exhibits the same professional courtesy. Bodily organs for the mental powers are not looked for by him. Man was created, we are told, "out of the dust of the earth, and there was breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Our philosophers divide what in his creation was joined together. One examines the body without the mind; the other speculates about the mind, without once thinking of the body. Nor is this the whole. The metaphycian studies man as if he were the sole inhabitant of the earth, instead of being one of a vast multitude of species, and "having dominion," only, over all the rest. Man is fond of fancying himself unique, subject to no laws but such as relate wholly to himself; but this fancy is an error, and must be corrected before he can proceed far in the process of self-discovery. He is peculiar, no doubt; but no peculiarity can be known unless by comparison and contrast. To resolve even the simple problem which meets us almost at the threshold of our philosophy, as to the distinguishing characteristics of our species, we must have studied it, not alone, but in close connexion with the other works of the Creator. All this, however, is left to the naturalist, and the naturalist stops short on the same frontier, studying all but man, and leaving him

to others. We may, indeed, trace the lines of demarcation further. The metaphysician will not even occupy the whole field of observation offered him by his own species. He takes but an individual of it. "*Self*-observation," "*internal* consciousness," is referred to as the sole foundation of his system of philosophy. It is for the biographer to contemplate and describe his neighbors, and for the historian to discuss the varieties of national disposition; all this tedious process may safely be neglected by the philosopher. The old proverb, "many men, many minds," is dispensed with in his favor, and he is required only to closet himself for his own likeness to be drawn by his own hand, and then published as the unvarying type and pattern of his species. The historian, or biographer, is, of course, at liberty to take his own or any other type he pleases, or none at all, if he likes that course better; so that while our theories, thus partially constructed, take no note of the varieties of human character, our actual records of those varieties are in practice so drawn up as to contribute little or no material for creating any sounder system.*

Now, in all this, we say nothing against the true principles of the division of labor. No man is wise at all times, or on all subjects. It is not necessary that every one should aim at making discoveries of his own in every department at once. It is well enough that one should be an anatomist, or physiologist, another an observer of the mind, and a third be devoted to historical researches; that different classes should select morals, religion, and taste, as the subjects of their several speculations; and that other classes still should undertake to reduce all to practice by teaching or legislation. All this is, so far, as it should be. One is better fitted for success in one department, another in another. The fault lies in their non-intercourse, not in their original separation. The surveyor of a public work makes one set of his workmen dig and bring materials, another set design, another execute, and of each sect he assigns his subdivisions to the particular sections of his work; but does he, for the sake of a division of labor, tell them each to work without regard to their fellows? The materials are provided with a view to the design; the design is regulated by the materials, and directs the mode of execution; the execution is dependent upon both; the most distant sections of the work proceed with constant reference to one another.

* Welsh, in his life of Dr. Brown, tells us that his course of lectures was composed at the rate of a lecture a day, each during the day before its delivery. They were never materially altered afterwards. Brown was at the time a young man, and, with such rapidity, it is wonderful that he should have brought together so much valuable matter as his system contains. How striking a contrast does the history of Phrenology furnish!

True, the labor is divided among many, but the many are kept in communication, more or less direct; their efforts tend to the same result, and the strength of the laborers is in their union. Now there is none, or next to none, of this among our philosophical laborers. One class gives itself no concern about the successes of another. The practical cares nothing for the rise and fall of theories; the speculator gives himself no trouble to look at the practical working of his schemes; the collector of knowledge neither seeks to know its uses, nor to bring them about. There is a great work to be effected—the improvement of man; but it is lost sight of in the multiplicity of its details, even by most of those who are engaged in it. They have divided the work so completely as to forget its real unity, and are each idly thinking to do all themselves, by working at some odd corner of it, instead of all combining with each other to carry on all parts together.

It is owing mainly to this cause that so many clashing theories of man, that so many opposite schemes for educating and governing him, have been at different times brought forward by men, themselves in all respects competent to solve the problems which these inquiries suggest. So long, indeed, as this cause continues to operate, the same result must follow. On the basis of internal consciousness, one man with great honesty of feeling, and comparatively less of reflective power, founds the doctrine of a moral sense, acting instinctively, as an integral part of himself, and hence of all men; another, with less of the feeling, and more of reflection, on the same principle denies its existence, and maintains a doctrine of utility. The benevolent man is apt to refer all honesty to kindness and good feeling; the religious man, to the influence of a creed; the ambitious, to the operation of society. Here, again, we see a philosopher dwelling on the insufficiency of the evidence for the existence of external nature; there, another declaring his entire satisfaction with it. The one is of a reflective rather than of an observing turn; and because unable to supply his want of observation by reasoning, rejects the evidence of his senses altogether; the other is an observer, and because of his observing powers, cannot do what belongs to the reflective, takes the directly opposite course, and laughs at speculations really true, though brought forward by his antagonist a little out of place. A third, whose mental constitution is, so to speak, more symmetrical, sees the fallacy of both, and gives a divided empire, reason and observation, the two sources of his own belief. There is no end to such diversities of doctrine. As matters stand, it is the great business of each of our public teachers to pull down the conclusions of their predecessors, that they may erect their own instead of them. This

procedure will continue till each philosopher is taught to widen the field of his observation, so as to embrace not only the peculiarities of an individual, but those of all men in all ages and places to which history refers—the entire range of the phenomena presented by his species, as contrasted with those of other animals, and viewed in connexion with those other varieties of a corporeal nature which are also observed between them. This is more than is attempted by the naturalist in his department. When a theory, or, in other words, a systematic natural history of man, is raised on this wide and deep foundation, it will be found to serve the purpose of our speculative moralists, and also of our practical men; and they, instead of slighting, as they now too often do, the physical department of their science, will carry it out to results, which shall be acknowledged by all as in the highest degree important to humanity.

But there is another defect in our present fashionable course, which should be noticed. We have been too apt to rest contented with mere general terms and statements, as if these were really knowledge, instead of being merely means for making knowledge easier of attainment by arranging its results. Useful knowledge is special in its character, and treats not of abstracts, but of concretes. Abstraction and generalization are but aids to our thorough conception of the particulars arranged. For a botanist to talk merely of organized matter, is not the way for him to benefit his pupil, or to communicate to them any useful information. He must descend to particular description in order to attain his object. Trees must be distinguished from other vegetable productions, the oak species from other trees, the particular kind of oak from every other kind, the peculiarities of each kind as influenced by the circumstances of the individual specimen. These particulars are what we make use of in real life. The general laws, as they are called, of nature, serve us only as they give us an easy clue to a vast multitude of them. How stands the case with our students of the mind? We read a vast deal about such abstractions as pain and pleasure, vice and virtue, emotions, perceptions, &c.; but is this all we want to know? There are different kinds of pain and vice, of feelings, powers, and senses. It is with these particulars that we have to do in real life, and the object therefore of philosophy should be *so* to generalize her statements in regard to them as to help us to recognize and distinguish them in the actual appearances which they present to us. This is not the case with the older systems of the schools, and hence, in part, their unprofitable character.

Such, then, are among the causes which may be cited to account for the existing prevalent neglect of the study of human nature. A question

may be raised as to the extent of their influence. Have all inquirers hitherto pursued the wrong course, or are there not some to be excepted from the censure? It is common among the adherents of the older schools to affect contempt for the newer pretensions of the phrenological system. Is this contempt justifiable, either on the score of their own pre-eminence, or of their opponents manifest inferiority? "First cast out the beam out of thine own eye," is a direction from a high authority. The men who, for so long a course of years, have gone on, one after another, all more or less mistaking both the object and the mode of inquiry into their own nature, are not the persons whose oracular nod is at once to sentence another system, and one better constructed than their own, to neglect.

We speak of Phrenology as a system better constructed than any of its predecessors. Is it not so? Regard it in all those points of view to which we have just subjected its rivals. After mature discussion, through a long series of years, in the course of which it has been assailed by men of abundant talent, and with very abundant zeal, it is now supported by a very large proportion of the scientific world, by a majority indeed, a large and overwhelming majority of those men of science who have ever really studied its merits. These adherents, in different countrys, of different creeds, with different mental powers and dispositions, under different influences of habit and education, do yet, in every essential point, agree, both as regards the results and the course of procedure of the first founders of their doctrine. Long before Stewart's death, Brown's system of philosophy had supplanted his in the halls of his own university, just as his own had in a great degree supplanted Reid's. The philosophy of Brown, in its turn, has yielded its supremacy, and is no longer received in the class-room which was once its own. But where is the supplanter of Gall, or Spurzheim, or Combe? It is true that in some things, even these three men do not wholly coincide; but on every leading point, on every thing essential to their doctrines, they and their followers agree as closely as, perhaps more so than, any equal number of inquirers into botany or chemistry, or any other of the admitted sciences.

The procedure in which they all thus coincide, is just that which we have marked out as deserving and receiving the sanction of the father of the inductive philosophy. They have studied and are studying man, in the widest sense of the term, all his powers and propensities, as variously modified in different individuals and nations, in different states of health and cultivation, and at different eras of time. They study man as one of the many species inhabiting the world, and compare and

contrast him throughout with his lower fellow-creatures. They study all these, his mental phenomena, thus brought together in every quarter, in connexion with the bodily phenomena which the hand of nature has connected with them; making the philosophy of the mind proceed soberly and steadily with the physiology of the brain, just as the philosophy of the senses does with the physiology of other portions of the nervous system. They have dispensed, too, with all those antiquated speculations of the older school, which the experience of ages has shown to be alike endless and unprofitable; and instead of aiming at vague abstractions, and expressing them by general terms, have sought always for those special truths on which only useful knowledge can be founded. Is all this error?

The results arrived at—are they too monstrous to be credited? Our enemies themselves being judges, do we not hear the system continually depreciated as *an ingenious speculation*, the organs *ingeniously located*, the names and definitions *cunningly contrived?* There has been no ingenuity nor cunning in the matter. Any one who will read may know that of all this supposed tact and felicity of speculation, not a trace was to be found till many years after the patient Baconian system of Gall and Spurzheim had been expended on its discovery, The objectors then used to complain of the unsystematic and irregular form of many of their statements. Now the complaint is in a new form. The plodding practical "men of sculls" are suddenly converted into ingenious theorists, to suit the convenience of those who, *per fas aut nefas*, are resolved on having an excuse at least for the rejection of what they do not like, because they do not happen themselves to be its discoverers.

But we will not quarrel with the objection. We are willing to take it as it is offered, and to urge it as the strongest proof of the doctrine which it is brought forward to oppose. "The harmony of a science," says Lord Bacon, "supporting each part the other, is, and ought to be, the true and brief confutation and suppressions of all the smaller sort of objections." It was never objected to Reid and Brown, or even to Kant or Cousin, that their doctrines are so ingeniously made to gain support from every page of the historian or dramatist, or to explain the acts and feelings of men, alone or in society, that they deserve to be laid aside unexamined by those who wish to understand and direct their fellows or themselves. The fact, undenied because undeniable, that Phrenology is a system suited to actual life, consonant in its several parts with the thoughts and language of practical men, that those who understand it, all insist on its constant utility to themselves in all their relations of life—this fact in combination with its equally notorious history as

being a result of many years of tedious and patient investigation, pursued as Newton, Davy, and Linnæus pursued theirs, is the convincing argument in its favor.

We return to the point from which we started. In our fashionable systems of education, at school, and at college, we neglect those studies which are founded on, and conduce to, the knowledge of human nature. This omission is productive of serious evils, and cannot be too soon corrected. So far as it concerns the doctrine of the metaphysical writers generally, it may be accounted for by the errors into which those writers have fallen. The sources of these errors have been avoided in the course of the phrenological investigations; and the arguments, therefore, recurs, that the omission we have noticed is to be supplied effectually only through its means. When the phrenological views shall have met with the attention their subject requires from the public generally, they will be taught and carried into practice by all, as they now are—we should say, better than they now can be, by the comparatively few who understand them. "*Knowledge is power.*" The source of man's greatest power will be found to be the knowledge of himself.

ARTICLE IV.

CASE OF LAURA BRIDGMAN.

The history and mental developements of Laura Bridgman, a member of the Massachusetts Asylum for the Blind, have already attracted considerable attention. She is now in the twelth year of her age, and has from early infancy been entirely destitute of the sense of hearing and of sight, as well as the power of speech; in other words, she is *deaf, dumb, and blind.* Her case possesses great interest both in a physiological and phrenological point of view. But as all the more interesting facts in her history and character have been extensively circulated, and freely commented upon, in various works, we shall here refer to only one or two particulars.

In the last annual report of the Trustees of the Massachusetts Blind Asylum, may be found an interesting statement of some facts which occurred in the course of her education during the past year. This account is drawn up by Dr. S. G. Howe, (the Superintendent of the Institution) who is an able and experienced phrenologist, and who has

especially distinguished himself for his inventions and improvements for the instruction of the blind. It is fortunate that Laura Bridgman has fallen into the hands of a teacher and guardian, who is so peculiarly well qualified to understand her physical organization and mental qualities; and can, at the same time, describe and report the facts in her history to the public, in such a manner as to render them most valuable contributions to the cause of true science and philosophy. We apprehend that the more interesting and important points in her character are yet to be developed. Dr. Howe, in speaking of her progress in learning during the past year, says that a "perceptible change has taken place in the size and shape of her head; and although unfortunately the measurement taken two years ago has been mislaid, every one who has been well acquainted with her, notices a marked increase in the size of the forehead. She is now just eleven years old; and her height is four feet, four inches and seven-tenths. Her head measures twenty inches and eight-tenths in circumference, in a line drawn around it and passing over the prominences of the parietal and frontal bones; above this line the head rises one inch and one-tenth, and is broad and full. The measurement is four inches from one orifice of the ear to the other; and from the occipital spine to the root of the nose, it is seven inches."

Mr. Geo. Combe, who visited the Institution in the fall of 1838, and then again one year afterwards, says, on the last occasion, in referring to Laura Bridgman, "She has grown considerably in statue since last year, and I observe a distinct increase in the size of her brain. The coronal, or moral region, in particular, has become larger, not only absolutely, but also in proportion to the animal region. Her temperament is nervous with a little sanguine. The head altogether is of full size and well formed. The organs of the domestic affections are amply developed, and in the best feminine proportions. Self-esteem, Love of Approbation, Cautiousness, Firmness, and Conscientiousness, are all large. The anterior lobe of the brain also is large, and both the knowing and reflecting departments are well developed. The organs of Order are large, and she shows great tidiness in all her arrangements. I perceive a manifest and important improvement since last year. She manifests the most sensitive delicacy in regard to sex. When I placed my hand on her head, she was troubled and removed it; but she did not interest herself to remove a female hand. The natural language of her countenance expresses intelligence and happiness; and we were told that she is very happy."

Dr. Howe concludes his report of Laura Bridgman with some excellent remarks respecting her moral nature or sentiments. These observations

are so truly philosophical, and harmonize so perfectly with the principles of Phrenology, that we cannot refrain from presenting them entire in Dr. Howe's own language. Says Dr. H —There seems to have been in this child no innate ideas or internal moral principles; that is, in the sense in which Locke, Condilac, and others, consider those terms. But there are innate intellectual *dispositions;* and, moreover, *moral dispositions*, not derived, as many metaphysicians suppose, from the exercise of intellectual faculties, but as independent in their existence as the intellectual dispositions themselves. I shall be easily understood when I speak of innate *dispositions*, in contradistinction to innate ideas, by those who are at all conversant with metaphysics; but as this case excites peculiar interest, even among children, I may be excused for explaining. We have no innate ideas of color, of distance, &c. Were we blind, we never could conceive the idea of color, nor understand how light and shade could given knowledge of distance. But we might have the innate disposition, or internal adaptation, which enables us to perceive color, and to judge of distance; and were the organ of sight suddenly to be restored to healthy action, we should gradually understand the natural language, so to call it, of light; and soon be able to judge of distance by reason of *our innate disposition or capacity*. So much for an intellectual perception. As an example of a moral perception, it may be supposed, for instance, that we have no innate idea of God, but that we have an innate disposition, or adaptation, not only to recognize, but to adore him; and when the idea of a God is presented, we embrace it, because we have that internal adaptation which enables us to do so. If the idea of a God were innate, it would be universal and identical, and and not the consequential effect of the exercise of Causality; it would be impossible to present Him under different aspects. He would not be regarded as Jupiter, Jehovah, Brahma; we could not make different people clothe Him with different attributes, any more than we can make them consider two and two make three, or five, or any thing but four.

But, on the other hand, if we had no *innate disposition* to receive the idea of a God, then could we never have conceived one, any more than we can conceive of time without a beginning—then would the most incontrovertible evidence to man of God's existence have been wanting, viz. the internal evidence of his own nature. Now it does appear to me very evident, from the phenomena manifested in Laura's case, that she has innate moral dispositions and tendencies, which, though developed subsequently (in the order of time) to her intellectual faculties, are not dependent upon them, nor are they manifested with a force proportionate to that of her intellect. According to Locke's theory, the moral qualities

and faculties of this child should be limited in proportion to the limitation of her senses; for he derives moral principle from intellectual dispositions, which alone he considers to be innate. He thinks moral principles must be *proved*, and can be so only by an exercised intellect.

Now the *sensations* of Laura are very limited; acute as is her touch, and constant as is her exercise of it, how vastly does she fall behind others of her own age in the amount of sensations which she experiences; how limited is the range of her thought! how infantile is she in the exercise of her intellect! But her moral qualities, her moral sense, are remarkably acute: few children are so affectionate, or so scrupulously conscientious; few are so sensible of their own rights, or regardful of the rights of others. Can any one suppose, then, that without innate moral dispositions, such effects could have been produced solely by moral lessons? For even if such lessons could have been given to her, would they not have been seed sown upon barren ground? Her moral sense and her conscientiousness seems not at all dependent upon any intellectual perception. They are not perceived, indeed, nor understood—they are *felt;* and she may feel them even more strongly than most adults. These observations will furnish an answer to another question, which is frequently put concerning Laura. Can she be taught the existence of God, her dependence upon, and her obligations to Him? The answer may be inferred from what has gone before; that, if there exists in her mind (and who can doubt that there does) the innate capacity for the perception of this great truth, it can probably be developed, and become an object of intellectual perception, and of firm belief.

I trust, too, that she can be made to conceive of future existence, and to lean upon the hope of it, as an anchor to her soul in those hours when sickness and approaching death shall arouse to fearful activity the instinctive love of life which is possessed by her in common with all. But to effect this—to furnish her with a guide through life, and a support in death, much is to be done, and much is to be avoided! None but those who have seen her engaged in the task, and have witnessed the difficulty of teaching her the meaning of such words as *remember*, *hope*, *forget*, *expect*, will conceive the difficulties in her way; but they, too, have seen her unconquerable resolution, and her unquenchable thirst for knowledge; and they will not condemn as visionary such pleasing anticipations.

ARTICLE V.

PRACTICAL PHRENOLOGY DEFENDED.

BY O. S. FOWLER.

Ever since 1833, when the writer and his brother, L. N. Fowler, introduced PRACTICAL PHRENOLOGY, or the examination of heads, into this country, as a *distinct profession*, phrenologists have entertained conflicting opinions as to its merits. Some maintain that the science is capable of being applied to the ascertainment of the *leading* traits of character *only*, contenting themselves with pointing out here and there predominant qualities, and with philosophizing upon its application to education, to mental philosophy, criticism, legislation, insanity, &c., whilst they undertake to delineate character *in detail*, and attempt to describe the feelings, talents, tendencies to conduct, &c., of men, by means of their phrenological developements, including temperament, &c.

These philosophizing phrenologists maintain that this is impossible, because of the modifying influences of the temperaments, combinations of faculties, education, habits, regimen, associations, religious and other opinions and professions, conditions in life, and other circumstances, which render its application so uncertain, and its mistakes so numerous and palpable, that the credit of the science itself must suffer from such an attempt.

Now if this is really the case—if phrenology *is* thus uncertain and anti-Baconian—if its inferences are so often at variance with the characters of those examined, and, though excellent in *theory*, it is so uncertain in *fact* that its deductions cannot be depended upon, it is comparatively valueless—its students may as well close their books and cease their observations, its authors lay down their pens, and its advocates seal up their lips, lest it should pierce the hand that relies upon it. But from a daily and constant *personal* experience for many years, we affirm that this is by no means the case. On the contrary, multitudes, in all parts of the Union, are living witnesses to the fact that both in our public test-examinations and in our professional capacity, we have described themselves and their friends even more accurately than could have been done by a long and intimate acquaintance with them, or even by the individuals themselves; and this, too, *without* a knowledge of these other conditions above specified, but from the *developements alone*.

Whenever he can well do so, the phrenologist should by all means ascertain these modifying influences; otherwise he is liable to mistake, not so much the *natural* characteristics or talents, as their *direction* and

manner of exhibition. But by knowing these influences, the almost unerring precision with which he can portray, even in detail, the nicer shades in the character and conduct of men, must be truly astonishing to those who have never witnessed any such applications of the science. Many examinations of this character have already been recorded in the Phrenological Journal, but for a more complete and extended collection of facts on this subject, the reader is referred to our large work on "*Practical Phrenology*," or "*Phrenology Proved, Illustrated and Applied*," in which more than a hundred pages, including a table of the developements of marked heads, are taken up in stating the results of these examinations as compared with the characters of those examined.

It is true that where the developements are only commonplace, little can be said, and that little not emphatically; but even here, phrenology is as true to the *real* character and talents as it is in those that are more striking. Of course these ordinary heads should *never* be produced as *test* cases.

That practical phrenology has indeed great difficulties to encounter, is readily admitted;. but the question at issue is, whether they are really *insurmountable?* This we deny. True, it requires an amount of study and experience, an adaptation of faculties, and a power of mind demanded by no other study or occupation whatever. If the students of law and medicine must study constantly some ten years before they can be admitted to practise, what amount of preparation—of both original talent and of acquired knowledge—are required to fit one for the practice of a science far more complex and extensive than both law and medicine united?—a science embracing within its vast range all the ever-varying emotions and mental manifestations of the human mind—all the never-ending phenomena of thought, feeling, opinion, and conduct appertaining to man! Let any one undertake to calculate, arithmetically, the number of changes that can be rung on the thirty-seven faculties in all their different degrees of developement, and he will find them to be inconceivably great, and the modifications produced by differences of temperament, habits, associations, parentage, &c., double even this vast sum many times over.

Whilst, therefore, the utmost stretch of man's intellect cannot take into account *all* the phrenological conditions, any more than it can all the astronomical or chemical conditions and phenomena, the phrenologist certainly requires all the assistance that *he can possibly obtain*, together with a strong, an active, and a well-balanced mind. But *with* these helps, including a knowledge of those influences which modify, direct, restrain, and stimulate the several faculties, he *can* predict, with

accuracy, not only all the leading mental qualities, but also a great number and variety of their shades and phases. The fact is undeniable that relative size is *the ruling* phrenological condition, and that it will generally point out the true character and talents, these lesser conditions of temperament, education, &c., to the contrary notwithstanding. It *will* show the *natural* qualities, and these qualities "*will out*" more or less. Dr. Gall has fully established this point in his large work on the functions of the nervous system.

Again: phrenological books and publications alone, however scientific, or argumentative, or eloquent they may be, will never *force home* upon the minds of the *mass* of mankind a thorough conviction, and a complete knowledge, of the truth and importance of the science of phrenology. This great work can be accomplished *only* by its *practical application* to the delineation of *living character and talents.*

We grant that in Great Britain, where the means of knowledge are confined chiefly to the learned few whose minds are disciplined to close and protracted argumentation, scientific works and publications may perhaps form the most efficient and suitable agents for advancing this science, but in *this* country, where all are thirsting for information, yet do not take time to reason profoundly nor to read extensively, where practical observation, experiments, and matters of fact have taken the place of philosophical research, and lectures, of books, the voice of the living teacher must every where go forth accompanied with those *tangible* and *palpable* evidences of its truth which appeal to the senses, and which *experiment alone* can furnish.

Indeed, phrenology itself, in the wonderful adaptation its points out between the perceptive organs and the external world, shows clearly that observation and facts lay at the foundation of all knowledge, and, indeed, of all reasoning. Not only are the perceptive faculties the first called into exercise in childhood and youth, but their organs are usually much larger in the heads of the great majority of mankind, than are the reflectives. The scholastic jargon of the dark ages, their syllogisms, their "major" and "minor" premises, their sequitur and non-sequitur. their subtle disquisitions and endless elaborations, grew solely out of their substituting speculations for facts, and hypotheses for experiments, that is, in phrenological language, their exercising their reasoning faculties alone, instead of beginning with the exercise of the perceptive intellect, by observing and collecting facts. The perceptive faculties are the foundation of all certain knowledge; the reflective, the superstructure. The latter without the former, give the merely speculative, scholastic, abstract, theorizing, metaphysical, therefore-and-wherefore cast of mind

which of itself is valueless; but the perceptive faculties, exercised in observing, collecting, and retaining facts and materials, and the reflectives exercised in working them up into sound arguments and correct conclusions, constitute a well balanced and truly philosophical mind; give the true Baconian, inductive, a priori method of arriving at certain conclusions by ascending from facts up to first principles—the only possible means of arriving at scientific truth. This order of exercising the intellectual faculties, whilst it harmonizes with the constitution of the human mind and is perfectly adapted to the laws of nature, also gives correct judgment, sound common sense, and enlarged and correct views of subjects, whilst the exercise of the reasoning faculties unaided by the perceptives, causes the warped and inconsistent views, the intellectual lameness, and the fallacious and contradictory opinions existing among mankind. These remarks, which hold good in regard to all the sciences, and to every species of investigation, are *pre-eminently* true of phrenology; and the only means of sustaining phrenological societies, or of imparting permanent interest to the science, is for each member to observe and report *facts*, or coincidences between the developement of organs and their manifestations in feeling and conduct, in place of long winded essays and learned philosophical disquisitions.

The principle here stated will explain the want of interest in most, and the complete dissolution of many, phrenological societies, though conducted by men *eminent* for science and talent, and also serve as a hint to those who may form associations for studying phrenology. Even the great body of the common people, the mass, tired with gazing after the abstract and speculative, have caught the principle just explained, and hence the opinion pervades all classes, and is engraven upon every mind, that experiment and observation are the *only* tests of *truth*—that *facts* must *precede* reasonings—that perceptive intellect must observe the data before the reflective powers *can* draw correct conclusions; and therefore, that *theoretical* phrenology, like speculative metaphysics, is valueless. Accordingly, before the community in general, or even the educated portion of it, will listen to mere arguments adduced in its support, or imbibe the beneficial principles upon which it is based, they require to *see* its truth *practically demonstrated* by those who are experienced in the business and are competent to do it justice. And it is fortunate for phrenology that this is the case, because it is to this *experimental* tribunal *alone* that it makes its appeal.

Practical phrenology also enables every individual who wishes to test the truth of the science *in his own person*, to place his real character and talents side by side with his phrenological developements, and by

comparing the two together, to ascertain its truth or erroneousness. Much might be said on the advantages which practical phrenology offers for individual improvement, by presenting the only possible means by which we can obtain accurate and precise knowledge of ourselves—of the real and comparative strength of our mental faculties. And it requires no argument to prove that such knowledge is of the utmost importance in order to make any great proficiency in self-cultivation and improvement.

But the two following questions will place practical phrenology in its true light, and their answer decide its merits. First: Is the uniformity between the phrenological antecedent and its consequent, or between the condition and its accompanying mental manifestation, *fixed*, and *certain*, and *uniform*? Second: Can these conditions, or at least the leading ones, be observed during life? Every philosopher and every phrenologist must answer the first in the affirmative, or abandon the science as anti-Baconian. The second, Gall and Spurzheim have answered affirmatively in the very discovery of the science, and in pronouncing upon the characters and talents of men wherever they went. In fact, Gall never hesitated to express his opinion of the disposition and talents of every individual who wished it, or with whom he fell in company. Witness his visit to the prisons of Berlin and Spandeau, where he examined several hundred prisoners, describing accurately their characters, and even the crime in most instances for which they were imprisoned. Spurzheim was also ready on all occasions to test the science practically by examinations.

PRACTICAL phrenology is therefore sustained. It is indeed the Alpha and the Omega of the entire science—both the foundation and the superstructure of the whole edifice, and nothing but this same despised *practical* phrenology can either improve or advance it a single iota. Nothing else can prevent the science from becoming as theoretical, and speculative, and spiritless, as metaphysics now are—nothing else adapt it to the common mind or the present age—nothing else add to its facts or keep it to the true standard of NATURE—the only great storehouse of truth. Why then deride *practical* phrenology? rather let it be hailed as the only bulwark and anchor of the science.

We admit, indeed, that through its medium, many mistakes, occasioned by the carelessness, or inexperience, or obtuseness of the examiner, or by an imperfect acquaintance with those examined, are saddled upon it, which is thus made a scape-goat for the sins of them all. The phrenologist may also find mechanical, or oratorical, or other powers, of which the community in general, and even the individual himself, may be

ignorant. Had a phrenologist ascribed to Patrick Henry before his debut, those transcendent powers of eloquence which he afterwards evinced, he would have been scouted as an imposter, and but for the circumstances which called them out, they might never have developed themselves. Mankind undoubtedly *possess* much more talent, and moral feeling, and integrity, than they manifest in action. But the phrenologist tells us what they *possess by nature*, not what they exhibit, and hence is often considered wrong when he is in fact right. On the other hand, he may sometimes ascribe bad qualities to those who may have artfully succeeded in wearing plausible exteriors. As an illustration of this remark, we would refer to the examination of Benjamin Rathbun of Buffalo, N. Y. Some years since, when that individual was doing a business of several hundred thousand dollars, and was regarded as one of the most honest and trust-worthy men in the whole country, it happened that in company with others, he submitted himself to a phrenological examination. The phrenologist, (being blindfolded) described him as greatly deficient in Conscientiousness and possessing very great Acquisitiveness; that he was prone to dishonesty, and was capable of being a swindler on the largest scale. This was unanimously pronounced as a most egregious mistake, and loudly did the opponents of the science then triumph. But within the short space of two years, this same Rathbun was convicted for committing a series of the most extensive and complicated forgeries ever known.

But it is the envy, and even animosity, existing among men, and the consequent partiality with which they judge each other, that constitute by far the greatest difficulty which the phrenologist encounters. If he ascribes to an individual superior talents, or high moral worth, an evil-eyed neighbor, or a warm political opponent, will consider the examination a total failure, because it did not make him out a real rascal; whilst a *friend* will regard it as perfectly correct throughout. When both friend and foe, and also the individual himself all agree, and the science itself, not its imperfect practitioner, comes in contact with them all, then, and not till then, should an occasional failure be considered a sufficient loop to hang a doubt upon: provided its decisions are in the main correct. This is sufficient to prove and establish the practicability as well as utility of its practical application.

For several years past we have been accustomed to put phrenology to the severest of all tests, namely, that of making examinations *blindfolded*. To this, many judicious phrenologists have strenuously, and perhaps justly, objected, alledging that the examiner imperiously demands *at least* the perfect use of all his *senses*, and also a knowledge of the

temperament. Examining without the eye is indeed like running a race on one foot, impeding his progress, and rendering him liable to stumble; but let it be remembered that he has a mass of incredulity and prejudice to contend against; that his other hits are attributed to his shrewdness and knowledge of human nature, physiognomy, &c.; that by these blindfolded tests *only* can this class of objectors be reached; and that, if successful, they are *seen* and *felt* to be conclusive and final, leaving no grounds of appeal, no room for evasion. If decidedly marked subjects are brougbt forward, (and on *no* account should any others be selected,) the natural character, besides being strongly indicated upon the head, *will* burst forth *spontaneously* in action and expression, disdaining all artificial restraints, so that no mistakes need occur. In such cases we never fail to hit the true character, and find them to be productive of deeper and more univerversal conviction than any other means that can be employed.

But these philosophizing, anti-practical phrenologists still farther object to this "examining heads," and "charging one dollar per caput," alleging that it lowers down the dignity of this high-toned and pre-eminently philanthropic science, by prostituting it to the degrading level of a mere catchpenny humbug. Now if practical phrenologists had no *bills* to pay, if they were not compelled to eat and sleep like other men, or if they had their thousands in bank, and could live upon the interest of their money, they might indeed afford to spend their time in prosecuting this noble science *gratis*. But every man must live by his calling, and the practical phrenologist no more compromises the dignity of his science by requiring pay for services rendered, than the lawyer degrades the law by requiring his fee, or the physician by sending in his bill.

But to charge "fifty cents per lecture," and "five dollars for the course," and to require "three hundred subscribers" beforehand at that, and to hold phrenological works twenty-five per cent. higher than other books, not only does not compromise the dignity of the science, but is even deemed necessary by some in order to impart dignity to it; whilst to take pay for *examining heads*, furnishing a chart, and indicating upon it the relative size of one's phrenological developements, greatly "alters the case," and savors strongly of quackery and humbuggery. Now the *fact* is that to require pay for examining the head no more degrades the science than to take pay for books or lectures, or for services rendered in any other profession or calling. The laborer, here, as well as elsewhere, "is worthy of his hire."

When in Boston, the immortal Spurzheim expressed his opinion that the time would come when phrenology, in common with medicine, and law, would become a regular profession, having not only its professorships

in our seats of learning, but its regular practitioners in our cities and villages, who would be consulted by parents touching the education and choice of occupation adapted to their children, and by persons employing appprentices, servants, &c., as much as the physician now is in sickness. This very state of things, this *practical* phrenology is *now* producing.

No one, however, can regard with deeper indignation, or hold in higher contempt than the writer does, this getting a smattering of phrenology, and going about the country *merely* to *make money*. This practice has become a very common, but is a most despicable one, and constitutes one of the greatest barriers which obstructs the onward progress of this noble science. But the season for such empiricism has nearly gone by. Such pretenders cannot now, as formerly, rely upon the mere novelty of phrenology for their success, and hence are fast becoming unable to defray expenses; and judicious minds will not hold the *science* responsible for their blunders. But to say the least, this examining heads affords a great amount of innocent amusement, and a very interesting subject of conversation and discussion; and, more than any and every other method that could be devised, is calculated to promulgate the science by bringing it in a tangible and exciting form before the community at large. And may it not be that the extraordinary rapidity with which a knowledge of, and a belief in, its doctrines have spread throughout our country within the last eight years, is owing *mainly* to this same cause?

MISCELLANY.

Mental and Moral qualities transmissible from Parents to Children.—This is the title of a series of articles now being published in the Mothers' Magazine, at New York. It appears by an editorial note, that they are extracts from a work in manuscript prepared by a Lady on the subject, and which will ere long be published. It is truly gratifying to find so much good sense and sound philosophy emanating from such a source; and, judging from the specimens here presented, we predict it will be a work of no ordinary interest and value. We sincerely hope that the female sex, as they value their own happiness and the best interests of the race, will take up this subject and examine it thoroughly; they will find that it involves principles of the highest magnitude—principles which are a part of the will and moral government of God, and which, when correctly understood and generally obeyed, will constitute the most efficient means which can possibly be brought into operation for the improvement and elevation of man as an intellectual and moral being.

Professor Smith of New York.—An able and extended review of this gentleman's Select Discourses on the Functions of the Nervous System, is now in progress of publication in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal. The writer under the signature of "Candidus," notices Professor Smith's objections to Phrenology in a manner which, to say the least, cannot be very gratifying to their author. Says the reviewer in relation to Dr. Smith's whole course of procedure: "He has, we may be allowed to say, set up a man of straw, of his own foundation, and then proceeded, *secundem artem*, to demolish it; but he has left unscathed the system of phrenology *as taught by its advocates*. He "expunged" from their propositions enough to render them vulnerable, and then set fiercely to work to overthrow, not the doctrines of phrenology, but such as he himself has substituted in their place; and then in conclusion, from his lofty perch, chanticleer-like, he crows "*Io triumphe*," and chuckles over his victory!" And after noticing another objection, the reviewer adds, "We regard our author's whole course of reasoning on this subject as disingenuous, unfair, and consequently unsound. He first misinterprets, then perverts, then attacks. It resembles more the quibbing, the petty pleading of a third-rate petty-fogger, than the manly reasoning of a philosopher, intent upon truth, and not victory."

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British Phrenological Association.—This body held its annual meeting the first week in June, the particulars of which have not as yet come to hand. The meeting, we learn, was fully attended; Dr. Conolly, formerly Professor in the London University, and who is distinguished as a writer on Medicine, was chairman; Dr. Otto, of Copenhagen, who stands at the head of the medical profession in Denmark, and who has long been an able and decided advocate of Phrenology, was present and addressed the meeting. Dr. Charles Caldwell, from the United States, was also present and made several speeches. A very interesting report of the proceedings of this Association may soon be expected.

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Phrenological Almanac for 1842, *by L. N. Fowler.*—This little annual is already before the public, and contains a great amount of valuable reading matter. This work, though small, and seemingly unworthy of notice, is calculated to be of essential service in advancing Phrenology, and we are happy to learn that from present prospects, it bids fair to have a very extensive circulation the ensuing year.

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The Northern Light for July—a monthly periodical published at Albany, N. Y.—contains a well written article on Mental and Moral Philosophy. The writer, S. S. Randall, Esq., speaks of the old systems of philosophy as "abstract conceptions of isolated intellect, captivating, indeed, and beautiful to the fancy, but cheerless and uncongenial to the heart;" while Phrenology is spoken of in terms of warm commendation.

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First-Book of Natural History, prepared for the use of Schools and Colleges, by W. S. W. Ruschenberger, M. D. This is an excellent elementary work on Anatomy and Physiology, illustrated with numerous plates, and should have an extensive circulation, as it justly merits.

EDITORIAL NOTICE.

The present number closes the subscriber's connection with the American Phrenological Journal and Miscellany. With the exception of the matter contained in the first number of volume 1st, he alone is responsible for whatever has appeared in its pages; but with what success or ability the work has been conducted, it is left for the public to judge. While many things have conspired to render his editorial duties arduous and difficult, he has been constantly encouraged and cheered on in his labors by the patronage and communications of the friends of the science, as well as from an increasing conviction, on his own part, of the truth and importance of the principles which he has labored to disseminate. In taking his leave of the Phrenological Journal, he would embrace this opportunity to tender his kind regards to its readers generally, and to the conductors of the public press in particular, for their favorable notices of the work; and, especially, he would return his grateful acknowledgments to all whose contributions have enriched its pages, hoping they will find their reward in the satisfaction of having advanced the cause of truth and science.

N. ALLEN.

PROPRIETOR'S NOTICE.

In closing the third volume of the American Phrenological Journal and Miscellany, its proprietors may be allowed to say, that, thus far, its expenses have exceeded its receipts *by several thousand dollars.* Indeed, so great and unremitted have been their sacrifices in sustaining it, that one of them, L. N. Fowler, feels compelled by a sense of duty, to decline any farther responsibility on its account. But though from its commencement it has called into requisition only to exhaust his utmost energies, even to the neglect of his family and to the injury of his health, still the other proprietor feels that he really CANNOT *yet* give up this moral lever, this means of good, for which he has so long lived and labored, be the sacrifice what it may, short of life.

"*It is* NOT *with the desire or expectation of* GAIN," therefore, but it is partly because he loves Phrenology as he loves his own life, and this Journal as its life-guard, and partly in the hope that the friends of the science, not by good *wishes* alone, but *by their subscriptions and exertions in its behalf*, will yet place it upon a permanent foundation, but *mostly* to advance this science of sciences by rescuing from oblivion its most valuable facts and suggestions, that he will *sustain it* ANOTHER YEAR, thereby continuing the probation which it holds out to phrenologists in which to solve the eventful problem: WILL THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SUSTAIN A PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNAL?

O. S. FOWLER,
L. N. FOWLER.

N. B. For particulars as to some contemplated changes, the reader is referred to the pages following the index.

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